Sunday, July 4, 1948
The Committee of Five met yesterday. It heard from Yisrael [Galili] and in the evening from Galili [should be: Yigael Yadin]. A few things became clear to me yesterday. I don't know whether Yisrael is the victim or perpetrator of an intricate plot by his party to take over the army, and towards this end to be rid of me.
I also had a meeting with a few Palmach members - and they're already familiar with all the "arguments" posed by Yisrael and his associates. Mapam's machinery is working.
Yisrael claims that ever since he was fired [from the position of Chief of National Headquarters] the "Organization" [i.e., the army - carryover terminology from Haganah days] has nearly been destroyed, has remained without a command, without a chief of staff, without an administration. My involvement in military matters has not always been productive.
The department heads and commanders don't always know who they report to. It's not clear who makes the rules. There've been no meetings with brigade commanders. There's no Artillery Corps manpower. The Moriah [Battalion, of the Jerusalem Brigade] revolted even before the truce, and Yisrael wasn't tasked with going to Jerusalem. In the meantime, a second battalion revolted. Tanks arrived - and it's not clear who should receive them. He doesn't know whether this is a job for Logistics or Operations. There's no coordination between the departments.
One of the reasons for the collapse of discipline since [Y. Galili] was fired - that they don't know who they report to. There's no contact with commanders. The conditions of captivity are not known. Although there are trials - there's no judicial authority. There's no consultation at the Staff except when it comes to operations. The department heads feel they've been deprived of any sense of responsibility. No department is taking responsibility for his report [those who report to him]. Confidence in the department administrators is lacking. The Jerusalem commander was appointed in a peculiar way. There's excessive centralization.
Approval of commanders: The department heads and Yisrael (aside from Lehrer [Zadok]) prepared a list of commanders. Yigal P. [Allon] served a few weeks at the Jerusalem front. He served with Stone [Marcus]. He has a staff. Makleff does not have a staff; why was [Nahum] Sarig ruled out and Eliahu Cohen [Ben-Hur] appointed? How is it that they removed Zvi Ayalon from the Staff? A modest, positive man.
Yigael claimed: There was a work overload and therefore irritability, and sometimes outbursts. He already sent a letter once, when the Chief of National Headquarters was fired [on May 6]. B. G. takes drastic steps before the date of a [military] operation - on the assumption that the situation will force the commanders and Staff members to stay. His superiors do not have the same sense of responsibility. A myth has emerged that the department heads are wrangling - it's not true.
When is the [defense minister] allowed to make a decision that goes against the Staff? There was a lack of discipline [even] before Yisrael's dismissal, in contrast to what B. G. says.
There were instances of unjustified outbursts. He had the nightmare of Jerusalem - because B. G. was overly concerned about Jerusalem, as if he, Yigael, does not hold Jerusalem dear. [According to him] I interfered unnecessarily with the order to send 2 mortars to Jerusalem. Everything was suspect. I gave an order to capture Deir Ayyub - but the forces were lacking. I interfered by sending Brigade Zayin [the 7th Brigade] too soon. When he asked me what to do - I answered rudely: the brigade commander will decide. The Brigade Zayin action in Latrun was a catastrophe. This was interference on my part that went against the schemes [plans]. It closed off the road to Jerusalem. Palmach is a bold, disciplined force. Regarding the recent appointments - I saw this as a conspiracy. B. A. is irritable, difficult, etc. etc. [Yadin's personal critique of Ben-Gurion's candidate]. There is a political rivalry in the army - Yigael is not [taking] part in it.
I explained the Latrun incident, and the role that the two clashes involving Brigade Zayin fulfilled.
- Yosef Yaakovson proposes a committee of the defense [and] police [ministers] and a [third] minister to decide on the provision of weapons [to settlements]. He proposes sending [Aharon] Becker himself abroad to arrange supplies (food, clothing, and equipment): clothing in Europe and military surplus and food from America. They'll be out of the country a month. There's no housing in Tel Aviv for the government officials [who are transferring there, some of them from Jerusalem] - he suggests Jaffa. A good suggestion.
Yaakovson is organizing 50-60 diesels [diesel engines] to pump water in the event of a power outage. Ta'as [home manufacture of weapons] is demanding 20-30 motors. It was agreed that the diesels would be gathered [and then] their allocation would be decided upon.
- Palyam [the Palmach's naval branch] has a naval stronghold [base] in Caesarea. It should be transferred to the navy. Gershon [Zak] doesn't want to accept this. For now Yosef Y. [Yizraeli] and Yosef Yaakovson are handling the matter. They've already invested P£ 30,000 and another 30,000 needs to be invested. I'll clarify the issue with Gershon. [To bring] the laws and confirmation of the rulings to [Nahum] Het [legal advisor to the government, who had requested clarifications concerning military court arrangements].
- I consulted with Yigael [Yadin] on the war plans when the truce ends. The "[Flying] Fortresses" will shell Cairo at night from a height of 20,000 feet. Then they'll come here and shell Quneitra, Damascus, etc. They'll park in Herzliya. The first [land] assault [under Operation Danny] will be directed against Lod and Ramle: from the north, from the east, from the south (Alexandroni, Brigade Het [the 8th Brigade], Kiriati). In the north - an attack on the villages of Tira etc. I proposed an alternative: the central Upper Galilee. Yigael is inclined towards this [option].
Only after the Lod and Ramle operation has succeeded will we turn to Latrun. The question is whether to wait until the end of the truce - in which case we lose the option of an assault, because we cannot attack in daytime - or to attack the night before it ends [the night of July 9-10] - both by air and by land.
- Alon [Yehuda Arazi] is asking whether to handle the purchase of naval cannons and C. [cannons] for coastal defense. What is the point of the question?
[Emanuel] Tzur reports that the first two Mosquitoes [British fighter-bombers] departed for here today, and another six - on the weekend. Tzur found an option for the purchase of thirty instruments [aircraft].
Avni (?) [Yisrael Dickenstein, at the time in Italy for procurement] has a connection for 600 tons TNT and will send them within the next two weeks. Alon has a connection for 200 tons TNT, 100 tons ballistite, 50 tons cordite. Along with this material Alon will send 400 rifles within a week. Alon's shipment of 15 20 mm cannons is delayed and will arrive by air.
- [Zeev] Schind is insisting on preventing the return [to Israel] of Nahum [Shadmi] and his men who are working on enlistment [in Europe], because if they leave - he'll be in charge of ETZEL enlistment. I suggested authorizing Shaul [Avigur] to assess the situation when he goes abroad again, and to issue instructions as he sees fit.
- "Our friend" [Loy] Henderson [of the US State Department] was appointed envoy to Turkey. His replacement has not been named yet. Good riddance.
- In response to my request that Hadassah send powdered milk and eggs - they're sending 35,345 pounds [about 17 tons] of powdered eggs on the ship Victoria, which set sail on June 29.
- The state of armament and our needs as of the start of July:
Rifles [we have] 40,000, need 65,750, must immediately order 10,000; [light] machine guns 5,170, [need] 6,550; [heavy] machine guns 430, need 1,500, must immediately order 200; rocket launchers 400, need 4,000, must immediately order 3,600; 9 mm guns 2,000, need 8,000, must immediately order 6,000; 120 mm mortars - 11, need 160, must order 100; 120 mortar shells - 5,000, need 160,000, must order 155,000.
- In the afternoon government meeting on the Bernadotte proposals.
- In the evening I spoke with Lehrer [Moshe Zadok] [regarding] manpower needs. Zadok ascribes importance to the MLB [military labor brigades]. He agreed to give them adults from the new batch of recruits, and will take 700 men out of the MLB over the course of a week. He's already taken 150 (100 for Carmeli, 50 for the Logistics Department - 30 drivers, 20 mechanics). This requires incorporating all who are subject to draft duty into the national MLB framework - and gradually replacing them with women and older people. Shkolnik [Eshkol] is opposed to this - for fear of a decline in worker productivity. Slavin [Ta'as], who employs 750 workers, is opposed, and so is [Alexander] Zipstein (of the [Tel Aviv] port), who employs 300. Such conscription would also raise the question of camps, clothing - expenses, as well as bitterness among the workers who are both soldiers and workers.