יומנים > יומן - מלא 20/04/1948

Jerusalem, April 20, 1948 I reached Jerusalem at 8:00 a.m. There were gunshots before we entered Sha'ar HaGai-but no one was hurt. More than two hundred vehicles with food made it up. - I invited [Eliahu] Sasson: "the King" [Abdallah] is on the rise because everyone realizes that his force, the Legion, has to be used. England wants to secure its lines of communication between the Mediterranean and Transjordan and Iraq-via Gaza, Beersheva, Hebron, Jerusalem, and Allenby Bridge. The Arab Legion is on that road. Thus it protects the Holy Places in the Arab part of Jerusalem. It's also concentrated in Rafah [Rafiah] on both the Egyptian and the Eretz[-Israel] side. Thus it wishes to secure the connection between the British Army in Ismailia and ''Aqaba. England itself will remain in Haifa with the Arab Legion and will secure the connection from Haifa as far as Bet She'an-Naharayim. The Arab Legion is massed on this line. The commander of the Haifa gangs is a Transjordanian-and it's not by chance. The previous commander, too, who was killed, was a Transjordanian. Without the Arab Legion, England cannot secure these lines and cannot engage the Legion without the consent of the [Arab] League. When the League saw that the gangs were taking a beating-they realized that a regular army is needed and the Legion is that army. From the Arab newspapers it emerges that the League has decide to use a regular army. According to the decision, an army has to come from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, and perhaps a company [!] from Egypt, too. Abdallah believes that none of these armies will last for long and that only he can take their place, because only he has an army that his country doesn't need and hasn't been in his country for long. The beatings that the Haganah dealt to the Arabs have made the Mufti and the Arabs of Eretz-Israel realize that they won't defeat the Jews of Eretz-Israel by their own strength. Now the Mufti is wholly dependent on the Arab League. The League understands that it's no longer a question of volunteers-but of a regular force, and a force accompanied by heavy weapons-tanks and aircraft. The Legion has to be confronted before May 15-and this confrontation has to be accompanied by hasbara [explanation]. Until there's a UN resolution that repeals [that of] November 29-the League countries will not invade. They'll invade only after the November 29 [resolution] is repealed-on the pretext that that Jews are violating UN resolutions and ruining security in the Near East. England and Transjordan have a mutual defense agreement and an attack on the Legion-means an attack on England. The Legion can be confronted in the south or in the Valley. We have to choose the front-provided we first secure Jerusalem, because here the Arabs with the help of the British, are about to occupy the Generali [building], the Terra Sancta [monastery], and other important strongholds. The Legion in Jerusalem is helping the gangs, moving them about, giving them fuel. - David [Shaltiel] appointed Dr. Izmozik, Shraibman [Reuven Shari], and Naaman Stavsky [Stoi] to look into the Sheikh Jarrah matter. The university also named a committee-Adv. [Shalom] Horowitz, but David isn't cooperating. - The city is horrifically agitated. Everyone's accusing the Haganah of a mammoth failure. Kurds and others are IZL people (overwhelmed by Deir Yassin). Neturei Karta wants surrender, the Yekkes [Jewish immigrants from Germany] in Rehavia are impotent. No one from the Executive and the National Committee has been here in the past month or so. [Eliahu] Dobkin suggests that five people be named to [the] Jerusalem [Committee]: B. Joseph [Dov Joseph], Shraibman [Reuven Shari], [Haim] Salomon, [Daniel] Auster, [Yitzhak-David] Mann (a merchant, "Mizrachi"). A political superordinate for David [Shaltiel] is needed. The public needs a personality who's got much clout and value. Ziama [Aran]: The Arabs in Jerusalem should be hit. They're not mobilizing in Jerusalem, there's no will to fight, no one's demanding mobilization and war. [He] oppose sanctions against David [Shaltiel]-but his judgment alone shouldn't be accepted. Even though he's systematic, brave, he mustn't be left on his own. This is a city with multiple political problems. The Jerusalem Committee must be assured a serious budget. The [aforementioned] Committee of Five needs a coordinator. B.J. [Bernard Joseph-Dov Joseph]: there's no social volunteering in Jerusalem. Shraibman [Reuvan Shari]: The inductees and those liable to induction should be moved out of Jerusalem to somewhere else, and soldiers should be brought to Jerusalem. Jerusalem needs a leadership that has the authority of the [Jewish] Agency and the National Committee. - At twelve with David [Shaltiel]. What did the Haganah do in Sheikh Jarrah [in the attack on the Hadassah convoy]? It sent five armored vehicles and did what it could, but there's a full and detailed report from Shraibman [Shari] and David endorses Shraibman's report. Yitzhak Sadeh was sent here as commander of the Jerusalem region, garrison forces and the surroundings, also a Palmach battalion that came here with him. Fritz [Eshet] as his chief of staff. Manpower in Jerusalem 3,470 on salary, well trained, mainly those at the outlying points (the [Etsiyyon] Bloc, etc.). All forces in the city are confined (to the university, the south, the Old City). For operations, there were two platoons until two days ago. Now there are five platoons (70 men were received from Tel Aviv, and reinforcements [that had been meant] for the Dead Sea were transferred to a municipal battalion). There are three British battalions in the city, as a platoon in Sheikh Jarrah. They're beginning to evacuate in Arab surroundings. The gangs seized Augusta Victoria while the British were there and are sniping at the university. Morale among our population is poor, lots of evaders, unwillingness to fight. The element in Jerusalem 20% normal, 20% privileged (university, etc.), 60% strange (provincial, Medieval, and the like. [The remarks thus far are David Shaltiel's.] - From Zion (or Zioni) [Eldad] I heard a detailed report about a manpower shortage, the poor material in Jerusalem, the lack of assistance from the high command, and the bad logistics (lack of clothing aid, assistance for families, etc.). - From Shraibman [Reuven Shari] I received details about the Hadassah disaster [on April 13]. The convoy set out at 9:20-10 vehicles, don't know exactly how many people-more than seventy (they buried more than thirty corpses, the others were ashes). Before the convoy left, [Moshe] Hillman-the liaison with the authorities-asked Webb (the police commander in Meah She'arim) whether the road was safe. Webb answered: "The way is clear," although the spotters told Hillman that morning that the Arabs had set up a new position. At the crossroads between the university and the Damascus road, the first vehicle ran over a mine. After this armored vehicle was an armored ambulance of Hadassah, followed by an armored truck of Hadassah and two buses of the Hamekasher [company's] Line 9. After them were five other vehicles. They turned around and went back. When they reached [the] Tipat Halav [clinic] across from [the] Bet Yisrael [quarter], where there's a Haganah point, they reported the incident. The commander, Pinhas [Barzilai], ordered his riflemen to give the vehicles cover by opening fire on the Arabs and activated, from various places, two Brens, one MG34, and a Spandau. They kept the Arabs from approaching the vehicles. [They] threw Molotov cocktails but failed to set the cars on fire. The center at the Schneller [camp] was informed and between 10:30 and 11:00 an armored vehicle from the Moriah Battalion and another for escort-which had had a flat tire before-headed out and went to the site of the violence. The first (Haganah) vehicle reached the site and continued on to the university (the driver and his men are still at the university)-no one really knows why. The second vehicle was fired on and its tires burst; it had to head back toward the city. From Schneller a 3" mortar was activated-to keep the Arabs from massing. A 2" mortar was activated from Bet Yisrael but was ineffective. The Moriah Battalion had no men other those who had set out in the armored vehicle. Then they took a platoon from a squad commanders' course, made them into privates-but didn't send them, because it was an insufficient force, because they thought the operation required a company. Arabs were in positions and on the roofs of the houses of Sheikh Jarrah, and in Wadi Joz, too. There were British at "Robert Post" (not far from Shmuel Hanavi Street) and at Antonius House. There were negotiations with the army-Schnurmann [Yosef Shani] (a liaison officer) with Brigadier Jones [the British commander in Jerusalem] and also Prof. [Abraham] Reifenberg with the army. The impression is that the army and the police knew about this in advance and made up their minds to let the Arabs carry out the murder. Shortly before eleven, Palmach [forces] came with the large [Harel] convoy. Negotiations took place with the Palmach commander via Levitze [Yitzhak Levi] and David [Mishael]-and he didn't want to give over his men and his cars. David reached Schneller-and then one Palmach vehicle came out and engaged Arabs in battle. Judging by the way the Army behaved, if a Jewish force had reached the location-presumably the Army would have fired on it. The people there held on until 1:00 or 2:00. Only when the Arabs approached and torched the vehicles and the vehicles burned for about three quarters of an hour (they caught fire at 2:15), the army laid down a smokescreen-and removed the dead and injured people from the vehicles. Two buses from [Line] 9 were burned. The ambulance was not burned. The [British] soldiers who were there claimed that they couldn't have controlled the Arabs with their light weapons and asked headquarters for heavy weapons. Headquarters, in turn, claimed-that for God's sake Haganah men mustn't go near and they [the British] would set things right. By order of an army officer at "Robert Post," our men stopped firing there-but the Arabs took advantage of this and approached, and our men resumed firing. The commander of the Moriah Battalion is [Zalman] Mart. A competent officer. He was on leave that day and his deputy was there. - Yisrael [Barzilai] about his mission to Europe: Spent six weeks in half of Europe: Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Italy, France, Switzerland. Met with the Eretz-Israelis to apprise them of the situation in Eretz[-Israel]. The emissaries aboard didn't grasp the seriousness of the situation. In Poland, the Party comes before everything and it's impossible to make progress in anything unless the Party is interested in it. [Chaim] Herzog reports that [Colonel] Lond sent the UN a report. He has despaired of the establishment of an international police force. The matter in Eretz[-Israel] will be decided in battle. Amazed by our forces. Told the British that these guys are invincible. Going to leave for America a few days from now.