יומנים > יומן - מלא 18/04/1948

Sunday, April 18, 1948 I asked [Ephraim] Ben-Artzi for his impressions about the way Operation Nahshon was set up. He says there was a shortage of staff officers (who deal with manpower, discipline, and logistics [in the British Army], and with us-almost solely in logistics). Eliahu Cohen [Ben-Hur] was Ben-Artzi's superordinate staff officer ([Ben-Artzi] served as a logistics officer). When Eliahu went-B.A. became a staff officer. B.A. had good rapport with Tel Aviv (there was an echelon in Hulda, an echelon in Na'an, and an echelon in Tel Aviv), operated around the clock-and it went well. Whatever he asked for, was given at once. It was a big drawback when the high command in Tel Aviv didn't review the battalions before, during, and after the operation. Hillel [Y. Galili] should have appeared before a battalion arrayed in formation. Haim Laskov was given a battalion that had been gathered up from various places. The commander was good but the battalion wasn't a battalion. Their belongings weren't forwarded well-because it hadn't been practiced the right way. Ben-Artzi was instructed to see to food, ammunition, and preventing wastage, but there was wastage: Instead of laundering underwear, they threw it out. The soldiers were given canned milk in their rations but weren't trained to use, and they threw it out because things were in disarray. The command doesn't value the administrative side-they see nothing but combat, but disarray and lack of food is detrimental to combat. The officers and the soldiers don't know how to live in the field. Only those who had a Scouts upbringing knew how to get by. Everyone received detergent-but they don't know how to do laundry. Battalion commanders don't know how to submit a report. Without accurate and timely reportage, it's hard to supply ammunition. Y[osef] Tabenkin didn't submit a report at all, and B.A. had to supply ammunition on his own and by estimate. Ammunition could have been sent with the convoy, but for lack of order and reportage-it was sent by air and much of it was damaged. The commanders have no administrative education and don't know that success depends on organization no less than on fighting. B.A. had to work all night by himself as though he were a lance corporal. There were too many consultations and too few orders, too many people arguing about policy. Somebody who's competent should command. The policy they adopted was right-attack and harass villages and make them pin down their forces. Logistics did okay. Dr. [Shimon] Mazeh and Harry Yaffe responded nicely to B.A.'s demands and delivered everything needed. The soldiers received much worse treatment than in a [regular] army. Their needs weren't seen to properly, they weren't given a bath [bathing arrangements] and decent nutrition. In the British Army, there are 11 soldiers in the rear for every combat soldier. Here, they were all on the front. The logistics orders that B.A. drew up-weren't obeyed. Accurate reports aren't being forwarded. An officer says he's got 700 men when he has only 500 (when they make demands) or the other way around (when it's demanded of them) and there are no rules and no judges. In an army, a court-martial takes place for this offense. When an officer is caught in an inaccuracy, he apologizes and says: How would I know-should I go out and count? They should have appeared before the soldiers and explained the value of their service. The convoys were successful-even though they had deficiencies. Blankets were pilfered because things were in disarray. Some 2,000 men took part in the operation. Only 30% got some rest. They never knew how many men were in a given place. Every officer gave an incorrect number. A Location List is needed [to track the units]. We have no such thing. - Yeshurun [Schiff] and Fritz [Eshet] in the matter of the Dead Sea: the convoys from the Dead Sea to Jerusalem have been halted. When Yeshurun saw Novomeysky and told him they were getting ready to send a company to Sdom and two companies to the north[ern Dead Sea area], N. remarked: "They'll be slaughtered." Novo doesn't believe in our force at the Dead Sea. He has to look out for the company's needs, even though he's a good guy. He said the whole [plant] may be shut down. It doesn't make financial sense to keep it open. The workers aren't working; they're guarding. There's no output. Nothing is taken to market. Yeshurun is going to the north[ern Dead Sea area]. Novo can't be relied upon. In Yeshurun's opinion, a company with auxiliary weapons should be airlifted there at once (there are lots of light weapons there). There are 120 Palmach men at Kalya [northern Dead Sea]. 80 combat soldiers at [Kibbutz] Bet Ha'Arava. Total people at Bet Ha'Arava: 200. In the north 250. In Yeshurun's opinion, the women and children should be evacuated (there are 70 children and 50 mothers in the north and at Bet Ha'Arava). If it's impossible to send two companies, we should adopt a scorched-earth policy-destroy everything that we can't remove. There are 5 tons of chlorine, 12 tons of bromine there-move everything that can be moved to Sdom. Requisition 70 workers-for operations. Keep a Palmach force there. There are "plenty" of light weapons-250 government rifles. Heavy weapons are lacking-2 machine [guns] 2 3" mortars. In Fritz [Eshet's] opinion, it'll take two battalions to capture the Dead Sea-Jerusalem road. We reached the conclusion that this is unlikely to happen in our current situation, and therefore: we'll airlift the children and women to Tel Aviv, add reinforcements to the location. (Yisrael [Galili] suggests that trained people in the settlements) be mobilized for excavations at the plant. Yeshurun advises that the runway in Jerusalem will be completed on Tuesday (the day after tomorrow). - Dolik (David Horowitz) visited for Loc [the Polish-Jewish consul]: goods [military gear] can be imported from Gdańsk and he's willing to make contact with three people on whom it depends. Loc advises [us] to get along with England and America now that we have the upper hand, because otherwise England and America will overwhelm us. - Yitzhak Sadeh returned from Mishmar Ha'Emek yesterday. Qawuqji was soundly defeated although our units are severely fatigued (there was no reserve at all). Qawuqji's demise was brought on by: lack of military thinking, the Arabs' inability to withstand a military operation. We stood 1 against 3, in firepower-1 against 8 (Qawuqji had 7 cannon, 12 armored vehicles). Qawuqji had three battalions-700-900 men in each. We had 340 Palmach (thereof: 70 in services) and 300 Field Corps. 1,500 trained men in the settlements need to be mobilized. - Gershon Zack [chief of the Naval Service]:-It's rumored that the Arabs are planning to attack the Tel Aviv port. All it takes to chase away the ships [that are anchored at the port] is to scare them a little. They're concerned that the [motor] launch from the police has been handed over to the Jaffa people. I asked Amos [Ben-Gurion] to look into it with [police commander] Flaningham-if he can. [That evening, the yod-gimmel ("the 13," the provisional government or People's Administration) held its first meeting.]