יומנים > יומן - מלא 28/06/1935

{P001} {0077-57} לונדון, 28.6.35 בן אהרון היקר - אני ממהר לענותך - איני יכל לזוז מכאן, וכשאוכל - יתכן שאצטרך לטוס לארץ. ענין המועצה המחוקקת עומדת להכרעה בשבועים אלה, ודבר זה מעכב אותי פה - ויתכן שדבר זה יטיס אותי בקרוב לארץ. שמחתי לידיעה על השקל. וודאי ידוע לך שבקרב צבורנו בארץ נפוצו 77.000 שקל. מאמריקא קבלתי טלגרמה (ב25- ליוני) שלע"ע יש להם ידיעות על 45.000 מצביעים, מהם קבלנו אנחנו 23.000, הכלליים 13.000, רמזרתי 9000. מחכים למספרים של הערים הקטנות ואז משערים שהס"ה יהיה 52.000, לנו 24.000, לכלליים 18.000, למזרחי 10.000 (השקלים באמריקא משנה 128.000, מאשתקד כ30.000-. יהיו 56 צירים. חברינו הפיצו 33.000 שקל). מסופקני אם רצויות בחירות בגרמניה. אם תהיה אפשרות (מסופקת!) אבוא לברלין. שלום לחברים. ד. בן-גוריון {0077-58} טלגרמה ממשה (שהגיעה עוד אתמול) על הראיון עם הנציב שהודיע כי בחצי יולי יודיע לשני הצדדים את הקווים העיקריים של המועצה וישמע את תגובתם. בחצי אוקטובר יודיע רשמית את הצעת הממשלה בהתאם לקווים. הנציב התנגד להמנע מהודעה זו. קבלתי גם המכתב ששלח ה.מ. למ.מ. ביום 21.6.33. I am greatly obliged for your telegram of the 19th June and your appreciation of the difficulties . that further delay necessarily entails. I fully agree with your statement that there is no alternative but to go ahead with the detailed Proposals for L.C. approved by the Cabinet last year. Two courses are therefore open to us, either to proceed now with formal discussions or to have informal discussions before I leave and postpone formal discussions until my return in the autumn. 2. During the last few days I have seen Arab leaders of both parties and I am now in a position to say that I can postpone discussions for some weeks without creating undue suspicion at our fresh delay. This will allow me time to give full consideration to the supplementary suggestions which you propose to send me at the end of this week. {0077-59} 3. In order to meet your wishes and to avoid unnecesserily embarassing Jewish Executive during the elections and Congress I propose to adopt the second course above, which is a combination of the two alternatives suggested in your telegram, namely to defer all formal negotiations until after my return from England, and to communicate the main features of the proposals for tne L.C. to Arab and Jewish leaders informally and confidentially before my departure for London. By this means I should hope to avoid matter being given undue prominence in the press since Arab leaders would be to some extent reassured and Jewish leaders would not welcome publicity before or during the meeting of Congress. 4. I should inform leaders that definite and detailed proposals would be put forward formally by me to them in the early autumn after I had consulted you and that these proposals would be consistent with the main features communicated to them. I should ask them to preserve secrecy and, in particular, to restrain comment in the press until detailed propoaals had been formally communicated to them. 5. You can rest assured that now, as in the past, I shall be in constant touch with Shertok and shall do every thing possible to avoid any action {0077-60} that would cause him unnecessary embarassment. In his conversations with me he has always urged most strongly that there would be no public and official statement before Congress terminates. In fact I think that was his principal request. I have no intention of making any public statement until I return in the autumn, unless I am forced to do so by the eventuality referred to in para 6 (c) below or owing to publication of serious misrepresentations on the part of the Arabs. 6. I propose to tell Shertok that: a) In no circumstances will formal conversations be postponed beyond ' autumn, 1935, b) I can safely arrange this short postponement, but further postponement would be regarded definitely as a breach of faith; c) if, before or during Congress misleading statements are made, for example that L.C. has been indefinitely postponed or Principle of parity accepted, l may be forced to make public statement. ראה תיקון בעמוד 74 {0077-61} I would ask that similar communication be made to Dr. Weizmann 7. As regards Weizmann's forecast of the effect on Zionist Congress of prior publication of proposals for L.C. I fear that as question has already been so widely canvassed by Jews some hampering resolution is almost inevitable; but I hope that as a result of our help and evidence of good will in postponing formal conversations until after Congress, the new Executive will adopt a moderate attitude towards Governments proposals. . טלגרמה זו נשלחה לי מירושלים ביום 23 ליוני, ונתקבלה אתמול בלונדון, אך רק הבוקר (28.6.35) הגיעה לידי. - רציתי מיד להתקשר עם וויצמן על הצורך להחיש את הראיון עם מלקולם למען מנוע בכל מחיר את השיחה עם הערבים בחצי יולי. כי אם הדברים ימסרו להם כרצון הנציב עכשיו - לא נוכל אולי להשיב כבר את הנעשה. אך אי אפשר היה לתפוס את ו. בטליפון, רק הגברת מאי הספיקה למסור לו את דעתי זו והוא הביע הסכמתו, אך אינו רוצה לעשות דבר לפני גמר "סוף השבוע". {0077-62} הטלגרמה הנ"ל של ח.מ. היא תשובה לטלגרמה של מ.מ. שיצאה מלונדון ב19.6.35-, וזו לשונה: I am grateful to you for your telegram of 16 June and for postponing deiscussions for at and rate a week. I fully agree with you that these discussions must start in the near future. But Dr. W. who has written to me and with whom Parkinson had a talk this week has represented strongly that if any statement which might become public concerning detailed proposals for L.C. which he knows are not based on parity is made before Zionist Congress elections in August two things will almost certainly happen: 1) Congress will tie the hands of J.A. by resolution preventing any compromise or cooperation in respect of L.C. 2) We shall get . a much less moderate and reasonable executive of Agency to deal with generally. In agreeing previously that early conversations would not do this harm he apparently had not anticipated more than general preliminary soundings from which actual details would not emerge. For his own part if faced with choice of non-cooperation with Gov. or a L.C. which he dislikes he would choose latter because (to use his own words) a L.C. would be a nuisance but non-cooperation an evil. This however would not be {0077-63} general attitude of Congreas and he is anxios to avoid Congress adopting uncompromising attitude. I confess that I am impressed by Dr. W.'s representations from the point of view of Gov.,s own interests especially as I am hopeful from things I have heard that Dr. W. himself might return from Congress as chairman of J.A. On the other hand I appreciate that Arabs are growing impatient and suspicious of delay. Assuming that Dr. W. is correct in his forecast two courses suggest themselves if we are trying to secure Jewish cooperation through him and retain a moderate executive: 1) Conversations to be carried on now but without disclosure of detailed proposals which would be kept back until you return from leave in autumn. . 2) Postpone conversations until autumn with absolute assurance that they will start then. It may well be that matters bave gone so far that (1) is impracticable and that (2) is also im- practicable if you youself are in Pal. during next two months. If so a third course might be to arrange for you to pay special visit to London in immediate future for official purposes and follow this up with leave here so as to tide over summer. If this course were adopted it might be best to make known that you were coming to {0077-64} make contact with new of S. and have a general discussion with him unless you can suggest any more specific object which would suit. with regard to detailed proposals for L.C. in all the circumstances I see no alternative but go ahead with them though I hope to send you later in the week some notes I have made offering one or two supplementary suggestions. In the meantime I should be grateful for reply at your earliest convenience to this telegram letting me know whether you yourself regard Dr. W.'s representations as sufficiently important from political point of view in Pal. to justify recourse to any of the suggestions whicn l have made or adoption of any alternative or variant which may occur to you. If in one way or another disclosure of Gov's proposals is postponed for the present I should be prepared to make it quite clear to Dr. W. that conver- sations must be started in autumn after you return from leave and that we should rely upon him to do everything possible to steer Congress clear of hampering resolutions. {0077-65} הרושם הזה שיצר ו. במוחו של ם. עלול להיות לרועץ. גם הנציב הבין מדברי משה שהעיקר הדחיה לאחר הקונגרס. מן ההכרח להסביר לשניהם שנקודת הכובד היא בהחנגדותנו לעצם המועצה. הנוסחה של ו. על מ"מ ועל נון-קואופריישון היא "אומללה", אם כי מצלצלת יפה באזני מ-ם. הסגנון של שתי הטלגרמות מוכיח שמוחו של הנציב הרבה יותר צלול ודעתו יותר קבועה מאלה של מ-ם, בכל אופןבשאלה זו. - לויטרבך מוסר לי מכתב של ליפסקי ורוטנברג על שיחה עם צולדסמיד וורבורג. הם קבלו את הצעתי על בחירת הנהלה מוסכמת, מבלי קביעת מספרים. הדבר המדאיג שבמכתב הוא הצעת "בורד אקונומי" מבאי-כוח קהי"ס, קה"ק, הכשרת הישוב, P.E.C. ,הסתדרות, האכרים, רוטנברג, נובומייסקי, פולק פיקא, יקא, .L.E.B בנק קואופרטיבי, וכו'. בורד זה לא יהיה ' לו קונטרולה על חבריו, אולם ע"י וויכוח ובירור וחילופי ידיעות ישפיע עליהם. בורד זה יהיה מוסד מיעץ ע"י ההנהלה של הסוכנות. ליפסקי ורוטנברג רוצים שבורד זה יוקם עוד לפני הקונגרס. - מלצ'ט כותב לי: I have read your Secret Memorandum on the Negev with the greatest possible interest, and I think you are on entirely right lines. The next question is what practical steps can be taken to organise development {0077-66} in this district. Is there any possibility in that area for private enterprise ? I might be able to help in this direction. Yours וכו'