

לוגדון, 28.6.35

בן אהרון היקר -

אני ממהר לענותך - איני יכול לזוז מכאן, וכשאוכל -  
יתכן שאצטרך לסוס לארץ. ענין המועצה המחוקקת עומדת להכרעה  
בשבועים אלה, ודבר זה מעכב אותי פה - ויתכן שדבר זה יסיים אותי  
בקרב לארץ.

שמחתי ליריעה על השקל. וודאי ידוע לך שבקרב צבורנו  
בארץ נפוצו 77.000 שקל. מאמריקא קבלתי טלגרמה (ב-25 ליוני)  
שלע"ע יש להם ידיעות על 45.000 מצביעים, מהם קבלנו אנחנו  
23.000, הכלליים 13.000, המזרחי 9.000. מחכים למספרים של  
הערים הקטנות ואז משערים שהס"ה יהיה 52.000, לנו 24.000,  
לכלליים 18.000, למזרחי 10.000 (השקלים באמריקא משנה 128.000,  
מאשחקד כ-30.000. יהיו 56 צירים. חברינו הפיצו 33.000 שקל).

מסופקני אם רצויות בחירות בגרמניה. אם תהיה

אפשרות (מסופקת!) אבוא לברלין.

. שלום לחברים.

ד. בן-גוריון

טלגרם ממש (שהגיעה עוד אחסול) על הראיון עם  
הנציב שהודיע כי בחצי יולי יודיע לשני הצדדים את הקווים  
העיקריים של המוצעה וישמע את חובתם. בחצי אוקטובר יודיע  
רשמית את הצעת הממשלה בהתאם לקווים. הנציב החנוד להמנע  
מהודעה זו.

קבלתי גם המכתב ששלח ה.מ. ל.מ.מ. ביום 21.6.33.

I am greatly obliged for your telegram  
of the 19th June and your appreciation of the difficulties  
that further delay necessarily entails. I fully agree  
with your statement that there is no alternative but  
to go ahead with the detailed proposals for L.C. approved  
by the Cabinet last year.

Two courses are therefore open to us, either  
to proceed now with formal discussions or to have  
informal discussions before I leave and postpone formal  
discussions until my return in the autumn.

2. During the last few days I have seen Arab  
leaders of both parties and I am now in a position to  
say that I can postpone discussions for some weeks  
without creating undue suspicion at our fresh delay.  
This will allow me time to give full consideration to  
the supplementary suggestions which you propose to send  
me at the end of this week.

3. In order to meet your wishes and to avoid unnecessarily embarrassing Jewish Executive during the elections and Congress I propose to adopt the second course above, which is a combination of the two alternatives suggested in your telegram, namely to defer all formal negotiations until after my return from England, and to communicate the main features of the proposals for the L.C. to Arab and Jewish leaders informally and confidentially before my departure for London. By this means I should hope to avoid matter being given undue prominence in the press since Arab leaders would be to some extent reassured and Jewish leaders would not welcome publicity before or during the meeting of Congress.

4. I should inform leaders that definite and detailed proposals would be put forward formally by me to them in the early autumn after I had consulted you and that these proposals would be consistent with the main features communicated to them. I should ask them to preserve secrecy and, in particular, to restrain comment in the press until detailed proposals had been formally communicated to them.

5. You can rest assured that now, as in the past, I shall be in constant touch with Shertok and shall do every thing possible to avoid any action

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that would cause him unnecessary embarrassment.

In his conversations with me he has always urged most strongly that there should be no public and official statement before Congress terminates. In fact I think that was his principal request.

I have no intention of making any public statement until I return in the autumn, unless I am forced to do so by the eventuality referred to in para 6 (c) below or owing to publication of serious misrepresentations on the part of the Arabs.

6. I propose to tell Shertok that:

a) In no circumstances will formal conversations be postponed beyond autumn, 1935,

b) I can safely arrange this short postponement, but further postponement would be regarded definitely as a breach of faith;

x) c) If, before or during Congress misleading statements are made, for example that L.C. has been indefinitely postponed or principle of parity accepted, I may be forced to make public statement.

x) 74 תיקון בעמוד

I would ask that similar communication be made to Dr. Weizmann.

7. As regards Weizmann's forecast of the effect on Zionist Congress of prior publication of proposals for L.C. I fear that as question has already been so widely canvassed by Jews some hampering resolution is almost inevitable; but I hope that as a result of our help and evidence of good will in postponing formal conversations until after Congress, the new Executive will adopt a moderate attitude towards Governments proposals.

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טלגרמה זו נשלחה לי מירושלים ביום 23 ליוני,  
ונתקבלה אחמול בלונדון, אך רק הבוקר (28.6.35) הגיעה  
לידי.

- רצייתי מיד להתקשר עם וויצמן על הצורך להחיש  
את הראיון עם מלקולם למען מנוע בכל מחיר את השיחה עם  
הערבים בחצי יולי. כי אם הדברים ימסרו להם כרצון הנציב  
עכשיו - לא נוכל אולי להשיב כבר את הנעשה. אך אי אפשר היה  
לחפוס את ו. בטליפון, רק הגברת מאי הספיקה למסור לו את דעתי  
זו והוא הביע הסכמתו, אך אינו רוצה לעשות דבר לפני גמר  
"סוף השבוע".

השלגורמה הנ"ל של ח.פ. היא חשובה לשלגורמה של פ.פ.

שיצאה מלונדון ב-19.6.35, וזו לשונה:

I am grateful to you for your telegram of 16 June and for postponing discussions for at any rate a week. I fully agree with you that these discussions must start in the near future. But Dr. W. who has written to me and with whom Parkinson had a talk this week has represented strongly that if any statement which might become public concerning detailed proposals for L.C. which he knows are not based on parity is made before Zionist Congress elections in August two things will almost certainly happen: 1) Congress will tie the hands of J.A. by resolution preventing any compromise or cooperation in respect of L.C. 2) We shall get a much less moderate and reasonable executive of Agency to deal with generally.

In agreeing previously that early conversations would not do this<sup>1</sup> harm he apparently had not anticipated more than general preliminary soundings from which actual details would not emerge. For his own part if faced with choice of non-cooperation with Gov. or a L.C. which he dislikes he would choose latter because (to use his own words) a L.C. would be a nuisance but non-cooperation an evil. This however would not be

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general attitude of Congress and he is anxious to avoid Congress adopting an uncompromising attitude.

I confess that I am impressed by Dr. W.'s representations from the point of view of Gov.'s own interests especially as I am hopeful from things I have heard that Dr. W. himself might return from Congress as chairman of J.A. On the other hand I appreciate that Arabs are growing impatient and suspicious of delay. Assuming that Dr. W. is correct in his forecast two courses suggest themselves if we are trying to secure Jewish cooperation through him and retain a moderate executive: 1) Conversations to be carried on now but without disclosure of detailed proposals which would be kept back until you return from leave in autumn. 2) Postpone conversations until autumn with absolute assurance that they will start then.

It may well be that matters have gone so far that (1) is impracticable and that (2) is also impracticable if you yourself are in Pal. during next two months. If so a third course might be to arrange for you to pay special visit to London in immediate future for official purposes and follow this up with leave here so as to tide over summer. If this course were adopted it might be best to make known that you were coming to

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make contact with new S. of S. and have a general discussion with him unless you can suggest any more specific object which would suit.

With regard to detailed proposals for L.C. in all the circumstances I see no alternative but go ahead with them though I hope to send you later in the week some notes I have made offering one or two supplementary suggestions. In the meantime I should be grateful for reply at your earliest convenience to this telegram letting me know whether you yourself regard Dr. W.'s representations as sufficiently important from political point of view in Pal. to justify recourse to any of the suggestions which I have made or adoption of any alternative or variant which may occur to you.

If in one way or another disclosure of Gov's proposals is postponed for the present I should be prepared to make it quite clear to Dr. W. that conversations must be started in autumn after you return from leave and that we should rely upon him to do everything possible to steer Congress clear of hampering resolutions.

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הרושם הזה שיצר ו. בפוחו של מ. עלול להיות לרועץ.

גם הנציב הבין מדברי משה שהעיקר הדחיה לאחר הקונגרס. מן ההכרח להסביר לשניהם שנקודת הכובד היא בהתנגדותנו לעצם המועצה. הנוסחה של ו. על מ"מ ועל נון-קואופריישון היא "אומללה", אם כי מצלצלת יפה באזני מ-מ.

הסגנון של שחי הטלגרמות מוכיח שפוחו של הנציב הרבה יותר צלול ודעתו יותר קבועה מאלה של מ-מ, בכל אופן בשאלה זו.

- לויטרכן מוסר לי מכתב של ליפסקי ורוטנברג על

שיחה עם צולדסטמיד וורבורג. הם קבלו את הצעתי על בחירת הנהלה מוסכמת, מבלי קביעת מספרים. הדבר המדאיג שבמכתב הוא הצעת "בורד אקונומי" מבאי-כוח קה"ס, קה"ק, הכשרת הישוב, הסתדרות, האכרים, רוטנברג, נובומייסקי, פולק, P.E.C. פיקא, יקא, L.E.B. בנק קואופרטיבי, וכו'. בורד זה לא יהיה לו קונטרול על חבריו, אולם ע"י וויכוח ובירור וחילופי ידיעות ישפיע עליהם. בורד זה יהיה מוסד מיעץ ע"י ההנהלה של הסוכנות. ליפסקי ורוטנברג רוצים שבורד זה יוקם עוד לפני הקונגרס.

- מלצ'ס כותב לי:

I have read your Secret Memorandum on the Negev with the greatest possible interest, and I think you are on entirely right lines. The next question is what practical steps can be taken to organise development

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in this district. Is there any possibility in that area for private enterprise? I might be able to help in this direction.

Yours

W. C. C.