יומנים > יומן - מלא 13/02/1948
Friday, February 13, 1948
Lifshitz [Zalman Leef] returned from New York this morning. He left two days ago in the afternoon. [He conveys] on behalf of Golda: There's 16 million [dollars], by the end of the month there will be 20 million. Some of it is overflow from 1947 [fundraising], some payments made for 1948, some loans against the 1948 fundraising campaign. The activity [appeal] is being conducted in harmony with [Henry] Montor and the Joint. She asks that I write to Montor, Linder, and Levitt. She'll return in early March. Things should be acquired cheaply and also freely. They want to know what we need. The money will start coming in next week. The KKL must announce that it has no claims to this money. There are Jewish fighter pilots - about twenty are prepared to immigrate. She advises immediately inviting 5-10; their salary is $ 200 (?) per month.
On behalf of Moshe [Sharett]: This week was difficult and tense. [Some] in America want to upend everything. The main opponent is [Secretary of Defense James] Forrestal. Many [of our] friends, including Bernard Baruch, saw him, but he said clearly: Partition was a mistake, and what went awry needs to be fixed. Zionism needs to be abolished. The best place for Jews is Kenya. The rejected [immigration seekers, Hitler's refugees] should be brought to America. If the Jews keep pressing the result might be riots and complete isolation. He's not anti-Semitic; he did a lot for the Blacks (!), but there's the threat of Russia, there's a need for world peace, there's America's national interest. The resolution [on partition] was adopted under unrestrained pressure from Jews. Now he'll act to change things. He reiterates the trinity: mistake, oil, Russia. And the UN resolution? Only a recommendation, not a decision. It's not a tragedy if they turn things around. He knows about communists entering the country from non-British sources. - Forrestal is the architect of the concept of a bipartisan policy against Zionism. He approached [Republican senators Arthur] Vandenberg and [Robert] Taft - to abolish the Jewish vote. Vandenberg agreed. Taft - didn't.
[Secretary of State George] Marshall, too - saw Jews and Gentiles. Marshall told [political advisor Charles David] Dave Ginsburg and Roosevelt [Jr.]: At this time there's no change in policy. He also believes that it was a mistake; he admits that London and Washington are talking about a common policy, but at a low "level"; he hasn't approved any change.
In contrast to Forrestal, he's anxious about the UN's prestige. Non-implementation is a blow to the UN, so for this reason he supports implementation. He's opposed to an international force because that requires Russia's participation. A force of small nations without the large ones won't be of any value, nor do they [the small nations] want [this]. It's not clear whether he'll support a militia. Marshall is disappointed with the Haganah's force. He was certain that we'd deliver a blow to the Arabs and scare them. But [Under Secretary of State Robert] Lovett argues that it's unclear who's attacking and who's under attack. Admittedly Arabs attacked Jews - but the Arabs are protecting their vital interests. Marshall - in contrast to Forrestal - is not impressed by [concerned about] infiltration by communists - and he's more worried about the situation in Persia [Iran] than the situation in the country.
[Jewish presidential advisor David] Dave Niles returned to the White House. Truman told him that the Jews have no cause for concern - there won't be any change.
[Senior State Department official] Loy Henderson told Epstein [Eliahu Elath] the day before Lifshitz left - that they'll oppose an international force, but not a militia, and if this is what the Commission decides - then they'll do their part (with equipment?).
Truman promised [Dave] Niles that he'd issue a message to alleviate the Jews' concern, but Marshall is opposed to this. He sees it as capitulation to Jewish pressure.
The Security Council [discussions] are embracing a policy of postponement.
[UN Secretary-General] Trygve Lie returned from Europe and summoned Moshe Sharett and [Abba Hillel] Silver. He opened with the following words: The English are the worst thieves in the world. Bevin is anti-Semitic and hates communists. [Lie] didn't see Bevin, but rather [Minister of State Hector] McNeil and wasn't able to get him to say what the British policy is. Trygve Lie is prepared for war. The fate of the UN depends on implementing the Eretz Israel [Palestine] resolutions. He's prepared to resign along with 200 senior officials. Prior to the resolution's adoption he'd maintain neutrality; now he's no longer neutral. He's our ally. The English and the American are now spying [on him], and he proposed special arrangements in order to meet.
[Trygve Lie] assessed the positions of Scandinavian and Western (Belgium etc.) countries. He doesn't believe in the forces of small nations. The Arabs would fight such forces without any integrity. The two major [powers] are needed. The concern that the Russians won't leave - once they've entered - is not valid. They pulled six divisions out of Norway before others did. He's prepared to go to Truman and Marshall. He'll pressure them. He wants an international force from the major nations. He decided to send a group of [UN] officials to the country immediately. The Commission will insist that it arrive in the country as soon as possible. They'll go to London only after the date has been set for their visit to the country.
Trygve Lie asked what needs to be done at this time. They said: appoint a government. In Moshe's view it's imperative to send a list of government members immediately. He asked about relations with Agudas Israel. Isaac Meir Levin approached Moshe, but the latter didn't want to negotiate with him. The Aguda telegraphed I. M. Levin [telling him] that he should conclude things with Moshe, but Moshe didn't want to. [Binyamin] Mintz is insisting on [government] representation for Po'ale Agudas Israel. Without this they won't agree.
The Commission of Five [UN Palestine Commission, responsible for implementing the Partition Plan] consists of two blocs: The Latins - pro-Zionists (Panama, Bolivia, and the also Philippines). The Europeans are pro-British. Federspiel [of Denmark] wants to delay, Lisicky [of Czechoslovakia] is also pro-British, but he's feeling bitter towards the English, and as chairman he wants to be honorable.
The Commission has submitted a second memorandum to the Security Council - on an international force and a militia. It's harsh regarding the Arabs, carefully worded regarding the English, but blames them. They're discussing an additional memorandum for the Security Council on the English position. It will be harsher.
It's not clear what will happen in the Security Council. There are all [those] who voted in favor. Americans don't want to take the initiative. There is concern that a few delegations will direct the question to their governments, for the purpose of postponement and rejection.
Lebanon and Egypt asked to appear before the Security Council as interested parties. They'll undoubtedly be granted this opportunity, and possibly so too will the [Jewish] Agency. The Trusteeship Council didn't allow the Agency to participate.
A letter arrived from Locker [stating that] an inside man [in the English government] told him that if they put a lot of pressure on the English - they'll agree to have the Commission comes soon and to evacuation of the port (naïve man!). They don't know over there what's been going on in Cyprus.
There's news [over there] about two ships in Bulgaria - which are about to set sail. This will aggravate the Americans. They're advising [that the departure be] delayed.
Moshe spoke with Gromyko [the Soviet representative]. He told him about the weapons from Czechoslovakia to the Arabs in Egypt. Gromyko was sorry [to hear] about this. He inquired as to the status of our equipment, what's missing, what can be brought in, and if it will be possible to bring [shipments] in after May 15, if the English won't impose a blockade at that time. He didn't say anything [about] whether they'll help. He doesn't have faith in the forces of small nations. Russia will adamantly insist on implementation of the resolution, but he cannot say what the position (whose?) will be on the issue of an international force, militia, equipment, and weapons.
He listened with interest regarding the riots in the country - this made an impression on him. As to the Trusteeship Council's discussions on Jerusalem, he said: [(in Russian) "We won't go there"].
Forrestal told Dave Ginsburg: "If the reality is that the resolution cannot be rescinded, then the English should be persuaded to stay in the country. Although they pledged to withdraw, they would leave a nominal force that will prevent the Russians from entering."
Moshe is requesting a list of people for the Government Council.
Moshe was asked: How long will it take us to create a government apparatus? He answered: 4-6 weeks. He was asked: A Government Council? He answered: immediately. He wants to know whether there's progress in creating an apparatus.
For the Americans, the main issue appears to be the Negev. They haven't come to terms with the Negev going to the Jews, and they want to do everything to change [this]. The Arabs will seize it by force and stay. Without the Negev [in Jewish hands] they would themselves feel more bound to the resolution. There's pressure from oil tycoons. They're convinced that all the territory with oil should be in Arab hands: A) Because they already have arrangements with Arabs, and the Jews will make different arrangements. B) Because the partition is not balanced. The Negev (a source of oil) will rectify the situation for the Arab state.
At the Geological Survey in Washington [Zalman] Lifshitz was told that at a certain stage they [government officials] didn't want to rely on information from the oil companies, and they approached experts at the [Geological Survey]. The expert - the one who spoke with Lifshitz - provided a positive expert opinion. All the data indicate that the Negev is an area with oil. The amount is unknown, but there is oil. Given this expert opinion, the opposition to us will increase.
- Yadin [reporting on Operation Lamed Heh activities]: Beit Surik was postponed. Because of the concentration of Arab gangs in Jerusalem, it wasn't possible to pull two companies out [of the city]. They launched an action in Jabalia [a neighborhood along the Jaffa - Bat Yam boundary] - shelling a three-story house. In Abu Kabir [extending from Herzl St. in Tel Aviv], 4 platoons were engaged. They encountered heavy machine gun and mortar fire. 2 platoons managed to enter - five previously designated houses were shelled. 2 platoons [came] from the direction of the street: one couldn't enter. After two hours of fighting, two of ours were killed, 10 injured. A second platoon entered. They seized booty: 3 German rifles, steel helmets. The fighting lasted three hours. The police did not show up.
In Yazur an ice factory was shelled. Three were lightly wounded. They carried everything out. Details are still lacking.
- I told Shaul [Avigur] that after consulting with associates I reached the conclusion that he should coordinate the Negev affairs. He wants to bring along Shlomo Kinarti [a founding member of Kibbutz Kinneret] - as an agricultural advisor, Luba [Aryeh] Eliav as a secretary. As to the commander he demands: that he know everything, that the commander consult with him, that he have a right of veto over certain actions, and that the commander [of the Palmach battalions] be subordinate to the General Staff. He considers Nahum Sarig [suitable] as commander.