Sunday, March 14, 1948
Moshe [Sharett] cables [from New York] that Y.M. Levin, demanding three representatives [in the government] including PAI [Po'ale Agudas Israel]. [Eliahu] Eliachar received a telegram that authorizes him to argue that one [Sephardi representative] on the council isn't enough. Moshe demands, rightly, that the negotiations be wound up in Eretz-Israel. Moshe learned from a secure source that [Yisrael] Barzilai approached the communist ministers in Prague on behalf of his party [Mapam] to give the committee certain instructions about actions of a nature that the Executive does not know. He insists on demanding that the party desist from these actions. Moshe advises that Stone should come to America to recruit officers.
Dr. Eliyahu Averbuch of Haifa sent me a plan for self-defense "if" war breaks out after the end of the Mandate. a. Classifying 25,000 of attack forces (KT, ko'ah tokef). For this force, in my opinion we have the following: 12,000 soldiers from the last war, approximately 5,000 Palmach. We have to train another 8-10,000 men. For this, top-caliber men should be taken, aged 18-25 (maybe up to 30). The training should last 6-8 weeks. b. A defense force (KM, ko'ah magen) composed of 30,000 trained soldiers aged 35-40, 17-year-olds of the highest caliber, 18-25-year-olds of second-level caliber, 30-35-year-olds of high quality. c. 2,000 sanitary workers, mostly women. d. 3,000 haulers. e. 1,000 roadbuilders and pipe-layers-total force 61,000. In addition, there should be armored vehicles (3-5 per 1,000 KT) with light artillery, 400 trucks and buses to transport 10,000 men, --- [number evidently missing], 5 trucks per 1,000 men for defense and communication needs, ambulances, and three mobile hospitals for the wounded (1 for every 100 men), large stocks of gasoline (armored cars-tank), and large number of wireless sets. Aircraft to forward reports. Apportionment of the forces: a. 10,000 KT for TA [Tel Aviv] and PT [Petah Tikva], 2,000 for Hadera-Pardes Hannah, 5,000 for Haifa and its vicinity, 2,000 for Safed, 1,000 for Afula and the eastern valley, 500 for Tiberias, 1,000 for the Huleh. A working reserve 3,500, of whom 500 in the eastern valley, 500 in Karkur, 1,000 in Haifa, 500 for the northern bounder of the Negev, 100 for headquarters in TA. b. KM, 8,000 for Haifa and its vicinity 3,000 for the eastern valley, 2,000 for northern Galilee, 1,000 Tel Or and the Jordan crossings, 1,000 to protect the water pipes in the Negev, 10,000 to defend the borders in the middle part, 5,000 in reserve in TA. As first operations, he proposes: eliminating the Jaffa enclave, disarming the population (the force needed is 5,000 KT-after the conquest: 2,000 KM together with 500 KT), conquering Lod and Ramle-by 1,000 KT each, immediately replacing them with 500 KM + 100 KT in each. Conquering Tulkarm by 1,000 KT from Hadera, replacing them with 1000 KM + 300 KT, conquering Kalkilya and Rosh ha-''Ayin by 300 KT, replacing 2 [sic?] KM. For Haifa-conquering it and defending it 3,000 KT + 4,000 KM. On the second day after the conquest, replacing KT with KM. Conquering Acre by 1,000 KT. Creating a broad linkup of the western and eastern valley, evacuating all Arab localities in the Jezreel Valley. Attacking Bet She'an by 500 KT from Afula, conquering Jenin by 1,000 KT, closing the road to Nablus and preparing fortified positions south of Jenin, remaining in Jenin: 1,000 KT + 1,000 KM. Conquering Western Galilee, positioning 3,000 KT in Haifa and with it 2,000 in Safed, 500 in the Huleh. Disarm the Arab population. Capture Shfar'am, Zippori, Sakhnin, Rameh, Majdal Kurum, Tarshiha, don't touch Nazareth. After five days: push to the Migdal-Ashkelon line, activate 3,000 KT + 1,000 KM, use the Lod-Gaza railroad. Isolate Gaza and don't attack it. Day 8-push from Migdal as far as the Gaza-Hebron road with 4,000 KT. Day 9-activate 2,000 KT + 1,000 KM, conquer Beersheva that day. Day 11-push to Hebron from two directions, from the crossing via the Tel Khousi (Bet Guvrin-Hebron) road, from the south via the Beersheva-Hebron road. In each foray, activate 1,500 KT, send 300 KT to ''Ein Gedi. Day 12-conquer Hebron. Disarm, don't damage the Haram. Strong force to hold the city, 1,000 KT + 2,000 KM. The frontier will then run ''Ein Gedi-Hebron-Bet Guvrin-Tel Khousi, Migdal-Ramle-Lod-Kalkilya-Tulkarm-Wadi Salam-Jenin-Bet She'an. This border is shorter than the current one by more than half. This border can be defended under two assumptions: 1) that no regular Egyptian army with more than 10,000 men will be sent toward Gaza. 2) that no regular Syrian-Lebanese-Iraqi army with more than 10,000 men will be sent to the north. Of … Severe fighting should be expected for the conquest of Jaffa, Lod, Ramle, and Tulkarm, in Haifa, Bet Shean, Jenin. And in conquering Galilee, Beersheva, and Hebron. He estimates the losses at 1,000 men, like 250-310 killed. It is essential for Jenin, Tulkarm, and Hebron to be in our hands. After the conquest, we will keep the following forces. In Western Galilee 1,000 KT and 3,000 KM, on the northern border (from Rosh Hanikra up to Lake Kinneret) 2,500 KT + 5,000 KM. In Haifa 2,000 KT + 1,000 KM; from Afula to Bet Shean 500 KT + 1,000 KM, Jenin and Bilaam [?] 2,000 KT + 1,000 KM. Karkur (the Wadi ''Ara road) 500 KT + 500 KM. Tulkarm 3,000 KT + 1,000 KM. Kalkilya-Rosh ha-''Ayin 500 KT, 500 KM. TA and PT 5,000 KT + 5,000 KM. Lod and Ramle 1,000 KT 1,000 KM, eastern border as far as Tel Khousi 500 KT + 3,000 KM, Migdal and Hebron 1,500 KT + 1,000 KM. Hebron and ''Ein Gedi 2,000 KT and 1,000 KM, Beersheva, pipelines, Negev 1,000 KT, 1,000 KM-total 23,000 KT + 25,000 KM.
Laub [Loeb of JDC] has returned from Cyprus. 28,350 people are still there: roughly 4,000 up to age 18, older than 35-5,600 or so, the rest-approx. 18,000 aged 18-35, 60% of whom are men (10,000-11,000 men). For training there's a nine-man mission, another 43 were added to them from ships. A few were exhausted by the work because it takes strong nerves to hold on as prisoners. Five important counselors are needed. Around (just!) a thousand people are in training.
The kibbutz people [members of the pioneering movements among the illegal imigrants] (around 5,000 men) want to train.
There's no assurance that the camp will be taken down on August 1. They're talking there about starting on May 15. The mission has no money. Several hundred pounds per month are needed-for travel, upkeep of members of the missing. Laub [Loeb] is returning to Cyprus at the end of the week. -
I made final "inquiries" with Yisrael [Galili] and then with Yaakov [Dori] about the special naval force, the brigade in the Negev, and Shlomo's appointment. Yisrael demanded an inquiry with the maritime workers-I agreed to it.
From Baghdad, our emissaries report: thus far, about two thousand men have enlisted for the war in Eretz-Israel. More than fifty came back. Their stories are to our benefit. They received antiquated weapons. Very poor human material. A secret decision at the ministry to stop the mobilization and the shipments. The money given [by Iraq] is estimated at two hundred thousand dinars. They say most of it is in the Negev. In the press they reported that three Iraqis have been killed. The economy is in very bad shape. The people are tired and hungry, there are demonstrations, the political situation is unclear. British propaganda is acting against us and against the Jews there with the intention of leading to the formation of a military government (?) that will honor the contract. The British bureaucracy in Palestine, including [Brigadier] Clayton and Grady (?) and hundreds of English employees were attacked by demonstrators. Tension surrounding the new elections for Parliament.
Biweekly financial report. The balance on hand as of March 1 is P£ [Palestine pounds] 95,153, from the Appeal 50,000, Kofer ha-Yishuv [the Yishuv's defense fund] 10,000, the [Jewish] Agency [loan from the Anglo-Palestine Bank) 100,000, the [Jewish] Agency (loan from Discount Bank) 50,000 Afek (loan fund on account of future revenue) 300,000, loan fund from bond proceeds 142,097-total 747,250. Expenses: for 250 tonnes of copper- P£ 11,000, chemical production 14,000, upkeep and payroll 360,000, fortifications 120,000, administration and transport 200,000, SHAI [the Haganah`s intelligence service] 14,000, naval 2,050, families of Hayil (?) 1,000, science (lamed-alef and shin-gimmel) 4,000, Ta'as [home manufacture of weapons] 15,000, signal (50 sets) 5,000, misc. 1,200, total 747,250.
Landsmann (Upper Galilee) advises that the brigadier imposed an eight-day curfew (on the radio, only two days-as punishment for an operation against Hussniyya and the army confiscated eight armored vehicles.
Zvi [Ayalon] informed me that a private individual brought an amphibious aircraft to the country carrying 4 people with 400 (?) kilograms of cargo, cost P£ 3,100. I approved its acquisition after our experts examined it.
On March 9, 1948, Jerias Khalif [sp?], a functionary with the Arab Committee, and security activists in Jerusalem spoke with Emil Gouri in Cairo.
Emil asked: How are things with you? Jerias [sp?]: With us, it's zay al-zift [going nowhere]. They're all squabbling with each other. In Bethlehem it was always bad and now it's worse.
Gouri asks: Why don't you approach Abu Moussa (Abdel Kadr)? Answer: With Abu Moussa it's even worse. There there's no order whatsoever; everything's lawless.
Question: What about those who came from across the border? H.: Allahu strana (May the Merciful One save us). You're even tougher to introduce order. Hey, brother, I don't understand how it'll be possible to carry on this way. If one doesn't come, everything will fall apart …
Emil-We have plans for imposing order and discipline. In another two or three days, I'll be with you.
In a cable from the Colonial Office to the Commissioner, dated March 1, 1948, the following is stated: "I agree that you may open negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Tr. Treaty of l946. ... Full powers were despatched to you in a letter from E.O.- You must be clear that H.M.G. is doing this to meet the wishes of Transjordan, but we cannot afford to be let down again as in the case of Iraq, but I am sure our confidence in H.M. will be not misplaced."