יומנים > יומן - מלא 21/12/1948
Tuesday, December 21, 1948 [Jerusalem]
In the morning I left for Jerusalem. [Dov] Tivon [Straubaum] [sp.] told me that his friend [the engineer Ben-Ya'akov] had received a letter from Moscow, where it was decided that ''Aliya from eastern countries would be stopped completely and hermetically no later than May-June 1949. There'd always been chaos regarding the Zionist movement. The dispute reached the very top echelon. They found a compromise solution: to leave the situation almost unchanged for the moment, but to stop ''Aliya once and for all no later than June.
The writer notes that this was not a necessary development or inevitable event. It's more the outcome of domestically and externally directed political maneuvers of the moment, than a historical imperative. The writer is certain that it's still possible to change things and bring about a 180 degree turn. It's necessary that people in the country know what's happened. We have sincere friends at the uppermost echelon in Moscow, but the current circumstances in Moscow are no secret: no one will dare to re-raise the issue after a decision has been reached - but our people here can raise the question.
And this is what needs to be done according to our friend in Moscow: beginning around January all of our envoys and representatives who have contacts should start an oral and written campaign using various rationales and formats, persistently underscoring the following fundamental ideas:
[Premise A -] The Jews' non-deterrable decision to take over the Negev. To settle about a million Jews in this part of their country as quickly as possible. The masses of Jews who will want to go to the huge kibbutzim being planned there are currently only in Europe - all of Europe, and it's not advisable to emphasize only Eastern Europe. In America and other countries it's also possible to find a handful of idealists - but no more than that. Therefore the Israeli authorities are asking the authorities in Europe to allow the departure of Jews who want this, without delay, and within one year. In the writer's opinion - only a plan for speedy and spirited evacuation within a year or a year and a half, only this is likely to be accepted. To keep pestering for [a few] thousand Jews - this is a lost cause.
Premise B - the Jewish people in its existential struggle is a natural ally for anyone struggling against reactionism in the world. And it's necessary to take into account that, in the eyes of the Jewish masses, a Jewish state is an existential need of the [Jewish] people, and therefore the differentiation between the state and Zionism is artificial.
Premise C - the State of Israel will remain neutral between the East and the West. This is not a hoax or smokescreen, as many presume.
Premise D - the English are beginning to understand that they lost the game, and seem ready to come to terms with our existence, but fundamentally the English do not accept the existence of a large and progressive Jewish state, and at the first opportunity [Britain] will resume its scheming to rip the Negev from the state.
Tivon - the slogan should be: Hindering ''aliya provides water for the English [water]mill.
The friend advises that we not spurn any opportunity to engage in talks with them on this matter. "We" (i.e., our friends in Moscow) will not be slack, and will try to impede the longtime "Yevsekis" [members of the Yevsektsiya, the Jewish section of the Communist Party, who advocated complete national assimilation], who haven't learned or understood anything.
- At 1 - a joint meeting [of the government] with the [Jewish] Agency Executive. [Israel] Goldstein [from the US, Jewish Agency treasurer since August 1948]: We are government representatives; he is a representative of the people. He inherited an empty treasury with overdrafts. The dispute [within the UJA] in America would have ended immediately if the statement from Israel had come sooner. There was the threat of a separate fundraising campaign by a group of secessionists. Now the matter has been sorted out, although there are separate fundraising campaigns, which are causing problems.
After Goldstein's remarks I stated that I am sorry there was an effort in America to dictate a "Mi Sheberach" [a Jewish prayer requesting a blessing from God] for people in America. The dictate and its content are not honorable, it's too bad that the Executive sent a cable, and I certainly repudiate the content of the telegram.
[Eliezer] Kaplan also aligned himself with this repudiation. [Yitzhak] Gruenbaum interrupted a few times and disrupted Kaplan's speaking - without sufficient reason. When it was his turn to speak, Gruenbaum complained about the secrecy - he hadn't known anything about a cable or an article [?], and why is Kaplan demanding that everyone return to the UJA? He also complained about Goldstein saying that they won't give money for the war or the state - in his view these are the two main things for Jews.
After hearing Goldstein's remarks I sent Gruenbaum a note saying: "You undoubtedly won't agree with me - clearly the Tzionistim [Ben-Gurion's derisive term for American Zionist leaders who did not appreciate the historical moment, did not accept the governmental leadership in Israel, and tended to squabble over minor issues at a time of war] have failed miserably in terms of Zionism (the reason is simple: the destruction of East European Jewry). At this important moment - perhaps the most important in Jewish history - the Jewry in the Golah [place of exile, i.e., Diaspora] does not have a worthy leadership for this time, and in Zionism's moment of victory - the Tzionistim have failed.
He sent me a note in reply: "I think that the word ''Tzionistim' accords with your thinking. Moreover: I wouldn't issue a verdict yet. I wouldn't have dared to hope that we'd have the means that are [actually] available to us. Especially after the destruction of Europe's Jewry, and of Eastern Europe first and foremost. And yet on leadership I agree. This is the greatest problem, especially in America. I'm certain that it's possible to find unexploited forces and means over there. For this problem I don't currently see a solution.
I gave him another note: "I must add something positive: The Jews in the Golah [place of exile, i.e., Diaspora] have not failed miserably - and they do sense the importance of the moment. The Tzionistim do not know how and are not qualified to lead the Jews; on the contrary: they act as an obstacle between the state and the Jews."
He again replied: "''As an obstacle' is an overstatement and somewhat unjust towards the Zionists. But they haven't yet recovered from the ''astonishment' that the rapid process of actualization inflicted on them. They still haven't grasped the naturalness of the matter. The events still seem like a miracle and a dream to them. In such a mental state it's hard to see the difficulty of linking efforts and reality in the right light.
- Lunchtime happened to include Granovski [Dr. Avraham Granot], [Yosef] Weitz, [Eliezer] Kaplan, [Levi] Eshkol, and myself. I suggested that during the course of [the Jewish year] 5709 [October 1948 - September 1949], the KKL [Jewish National Fund] purchase about a million dunams in the Galilee, the corridor [to Jerusalem], and the Negev from the state, and pay us at a price of P£ 10 per dunam. If the reparations that we have to pay [the landowners] are costlier, then they'll go up to P£ 20 per dunam. Granovski and especially Weitz (who still live by pre-state concepts) raised the question of the kushan [Ottoman-era property deed]. Granovski also [raised] the question of price. We agreed that Eshkol, Weitz, and Granovski would draft the main agreement, [and] a committee of lawyers would clarify the legal aspect (although it is the political aspect that is decisive here).
In the afternoon they argued over housing and education. They accepted our demand to budget 800,000 for education.
- In the evening I consulted with Moshe [Dayan] on the military situation in Jerusalem and the talks with Tall. I told him the government position - negotiations on peace, and only on this. Moshe thinks that Yigael [Yadin]'s idea about exchanging Sheikh Jarrah for Talpiot isn't practical. There's no way to get from Ramallah to Jericho, other than through Sheikh Jarrah. Moshe considers [Zvi] A[yalon] a military nobody. Actually has high regard for Dan Laner [operations officer for the Merkaz [Center] Front], but he's too influenced by politics.
I spoke with Yitzhak Levi [district commander] about the situation in Jerusalem. He thinks that ETZEL will receive 20%-30% of the votes and become the second party. It will be followed by the religious bloc. Mapam has no hold in Jerusalem. The Progressives might be stronger than the General Zionists.
- In the evening I dined with Rebecca Shulman; she staying here for 6 months. She suggests inviting [Robert] Szold to the country.
- I finally - after consultation with all concerned - resolved the question of the Public Works Department' repair shop that the army had inherited from ETZEL. All the machines will be returned to the Ministry of Labor, but the repair shop will remain in the army's hands.