יומנים > יומן - מלא 08/09/1948

[Wednesday,] September 8, 1948

At eleven a meeting with [James] McDonald in the Kirya [government compound]. He received a telegram from his government expressing the hope that Israel would be a major constructive force within the boundaries of [Eretz] Israel and a good influence throughout the region. The US government wants to help by any legitimate means in this constructive development. McDonald was called upon to express very clearly what he had already told me and Shertok [Moshe Sharett], that the US government had decided to use all its influence to prevent a violation of the truce, and if to its regret such a thing were to happen then it would support immediate action in the Security Council, if necessary - under [UN Charter] Chapter VII [which includes sanctions], against the aggressor. In the government's view such violations cannot be tolerated, because maintenance of the truce is a necessary precondition for peace negotiations.

       The US government would be grateful if the provisional government would inform it, by way of McDonald, if there is a basis for the government to believe that any Arab state, or group of Arab states, is willing to enter into peace negotiations.

       In order to determine if there's a basis for facilitating peace negotiations, the US government wishes to know, in complete confidentiality, the response of the provisional government to the following ideas, which admittedly are only tentative and intended for "trying-on for size" but are suggested out of a sincere and serious desire to help Israel become a stable power for the maintenance of peace and for economic development in the Middle East region.

       The ideas are:

       A) There may be a solution through an arrangement with Transjordan, one provision of which would be the exchange of a large part of the desert land in the Negev for that fertile part of the Western Galilee that Israel currently holds through military force.

       B) Although the US government believes that Jerusalem will become an international enclave, as recommended by the [General] Assembly on November 29 and the Trusteeship Council resolution in April and May, the US is prepared to accept another arrangement that would be acceptable to Israel and the Arab states, on the condition that the freedom of holy sites and access to them are guaranteed.

       C) The US government would like the government of Israel to consider a number of constructive measures for easing the hardship of the Arab refugees, which is a contributing factor in the formation of global opinion.

       The US government believes that demands that deviate from the framework of A and B above could undermine the establishment of stable peace in the country.

       If the government of Israel is prepared at this time to inform the US government of constructive views regarding the above suggestions, then the US is prepared to recommend the above plan to the mediator and the British government, which, it is contemplated, is capable of having a significant influence on the neighboring governments.

       I expressed satisfaction with the hopes of the US government that Israel would be a constructive force and I promised that to the extent that it depends [on us], the US government would not be disappointed, and that I welcome the initiative that the US government has taken to advance peace. The will of the US government, if it persists, has more potential than any other factor to bring about peace. However, precisely because of our appreciation of the US government I must speak frankly. The truce is not a path to peace, in our view. On the contrary, it inherently offers a veiled sanction [approval] for the invasion of the country by foreign forces, after America was one of the first governments to condemn this invasion as an act of aggression.

       This authorization to maintain invading and aggressive forces in the country thwarts peace. In effect this truce means - a denial of our sovereignty and the establishment of foreign oversight. We cannot tolerate that, and in particular we will not accept any form of interference in matters of ''aliya - for the sake of which we came here and for the sake of which we established a state. For the sake of peace we could come to terms with oversight [prohibition on the entry of draft-age immigrants] for a while, but not indefinitely.

       Regarding the suggestions, I wish to offer only an initial reaction, and only on my personal behalf, because we have not discussed this in the government. I do not understand why Transjordan needs another desert and what it will do with it, and why deprive us of this territory that only we need as space for development and that only we are prepared to develop? It is inconceivable that we would abandon the Dead Sea, a sea that possibly since the time of creation has not served as a source of life, and only we have made it bloom and [through it] created work for both Jews and Arabs. And as to Jerusalem, I'm glad to see that there's movement in the American stance, although from the outset I was in the minority in the Executive, [a minority that] opposed the division of Jerusalem and agreed to international status. But the UN did not honor its [own] resolution and a serious attempt was made with the help of a Christian government [the UK] to conquer Jerusalem for Islam. However, in my view, there can be no solution for Jerusalem that does not ensure a satisfactory Jewish corridor linking Jerusalem with the territory of the Jewish state.

       Finally I expressed astonishment that the US government was planning to mediate between us and the mediator [Count Bernadotte] and English government. There's no conflict between us and the mediator. The issue is between us and the Arabs, and even though we know that England was a party to this conflict and assisted the Arabs, the English government doesn't admit this, and if there's value - and there could be decisive value - in America's mediation - it's still desirable that the mediation be directly between us and the Arabs.

       I added that in my assessment we deserve all of Western Eretz Israel, and such a Jewish state would not detract whatsoever from the vast Arab territory, but - were I given the option - I would choose a much smaller territory based on Jewish-Arab agreement, over the entire territory without Arab agreement. And if America wants to try mediating between us and the Arabs - we will help it to the best of our ability, but there is no point in it mediating between us and the mediator or between us and England.

       I noted that it's difficult for us to discuss the question of the American "suggestions" for the same reason that I explained to McDonald two years ago in Paris, when the Anglo-American Committee was on its way to the country; McDonald interrupted me and said: "Yes, I remember and it's true. Everything you propose as a minimum, will immediately become the maximum."

       I said: There's another reason that I presented. You are not the other side, and any compromise we make with you does not qualify as a compromise, because the other side is not [participating] in negotiations, and there's no possibility of "quid pro quo" as a basis for compromise, but nevertheless I offered my opinion regarding the questions raised out of faith, on the explicit condition that they understand that this is a private and personal opinion that is not binding.

       Moshe [Sharett] added regarding the question of the Western Galilee - that if the Arab portion [of Eretz Israel] is annexed to Transjordan then there is no reason to deny us the Western Galilee, given that they claimed in the [General] Assembly in November 1947 - with a view to preparing a reserve for the Arabs of the Arab state - that Transjordan has large reserves. Regarding the refugees he said that we [are prepared to] think about returning a few refugees now, and returning some of the refugees after the war, on the condition that most of the refugees settle in Arab countries with our assistance. [Charles] Knox [counselor to the mission] and McDonald asked whether the door is closed to discussing the return of refugees.

       I replied that in my opinion the door is not closed - if we were to hold discussions with the Arabs on an arrangement for a stable, sustainable peace. As part of such an arrangement - anything can be discussed.

       Knox asked a few more questions to clarify our position, in order to know what to telegraph to his government.

       It's clear that the real envoy is Knox - he's the emissary from the State Department, and McDonald is mainly for decoration.

       - In the afternoon a government meeting - [Rabbi] Fishman [Maimon] announced his withdrawal because of the attitude towards religion. Yigael [Yadin] presented a review of the military situation, and Moshe [Sharett] of the conversation with McDonald. There were complaints that we hadn't consulted in advance with the government. It's clear to us that weeks would have passed without our being able to reach an agreement.

       - At dusk a reception for the new [Jewish Agency] Executive at the government compound [in the Kirya]; government members, authors, artists, newspaper editors, public personas and officials, and [members] of all parties were invited and came. Only [Shlomo Zalman] Shragai didn't come, out of protest.