יומנים > יומן - מלא 10/03/1948

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10.03.1948
225397

[Wednesday,] March 10, 1948

Zabrasky and Shkolnik [Eshkol]: Zabrasky obtained P£ 400,000 as a charitable donation: he gave 200,000 for upkeep, 80,000 to buy personal equipment, 10,000 for housing (shacks and tents), 40,000 for fortifications, 60,000 for transport, 2,000 to Aharon [Katzir, for the Science Corps]. Zabrasky has the chance [of obtaining]: 900,000 from the UJA over the course of three months, 350,000 income from foreign fundraising campaigns, 250,000 for the Negev from the KKL.

       He gave me a proposal for a new plan defining [his] responsibilities, and with slight modifications I accepted it and will formulate it.

       Regarding the treasury he proposes ten divisions: personal upkeep (Staff - Baruch Rabinov); support for families - a settlement committee; equipment and housing ([Aharon] Becker, Rochel [Yosef Avidar]); weapons and ammunition, transport and fortifications - Kozlowski [Pinchas Sapir]; and Ta'as, production, Air Service, Medical Service, Sea [Naval Service]. A central accounting department will operate alongside the Staff.

       Scheiber [Dr. Sheba] is requesting a budget of P£ 57,900 for the Medical Service for three months (February-April): assets [property] and equipment 30,600, perishable provisions 3,500, upkeep 14,800, headquarters warehouse stocks 5,000, dental care and recuperation 4,000. [We] also have to take into account P£ 50,000 [for provision of services to conscripts] to be paid to Kupat Holim [the healthcare network].

       A. S. [Air Service] for March P£ 63,305 (the details need to be clarified), chemical production, etc. P£ 71,090 (might receive 10,000 from the Negev). The science budget is 14,000 (the final provision wasn't clarified with Aharon).

       - B. Joseph [Dov Yosef], Mila [Michael Lubarsky-Bar] [sp.], and Hirshenhertz [sp.] - 90 trucks are needed [for supplies] to Jerusalem, assuming they do not all return on the same day (in practice 60 vehicles are needed each day; each vehicle carries 4 tons). They want Novomeysky to provide 12 vehicles (he has 34 trucks). It's also necessary to assemble trucks (confiscation?); drivers need to be recruited for a drivers' unit (Joseph proposes allowing them to live at home); Rochel [Yosef Avidar] and [Yosef] Yizraeli object to this.

       The vehicles need to be fully insured. Kaplan is opposed to full-fledged insurance because there isn't enough money. The vehicles need to be armored. There are 270-300 armored trucks in the country. Of these, 50-55 vehicles are available [for supply runs to Jerusalem], 20 vehicles are always in repair. We therefore need [another] 60 vehicles.

       Yosef [Avidar] suggests having a transport supervisor and a committee for transport. Mila says there is such a committee: [Mordechai] Shatner, Gorochowsky [Shraga Goren], Mila, Bar-Kochba [Meirovitz], [Haim] Ariav, Mishal [Shacham]. This committee has no authority to recruit without the Defense Committee, but the key point is that the country lacks vehicles. 60 trucks need to be bought (overall another 300 vehicles are needed); this requires P£ 12,000 (for each armored vehicle P£ 2,000). They are in Italy, unarmored, and over the course of six weeks will arrive here (almost on D-Day).

       Hirshenhertz believes there are more vehicles in the country that can be used for Jerusalem, and they should be exchanged.

       Mila adds: Safed has been without supplies for eight days now - for lack of armored vehicles.

       B. Joseph: There are 15 unarmored vehicles in Jerusalem, and another 45 vehicles to be taken if necessary - by confiscation.

       I asked Mila to complete a questionnaire on the transport needs for Jerusalem and the country as a whole - and the necessary enlistments towards this end in terms of drivers and vehicles.

       - [Aryeh] Bahir proposes Adv. Moshe Yishai as treasurer and coordinator in America. He's prepared to shut down his office and devote himself fully to this. Moshe Berger from Gal'ed is prepared to join him - and to help with [Avraham] Dickenstein's work.

       - On the question of vehicles: the Defense Committee decided (February 24, 1948) that a committee comprising Dr. [Shaul] Lifschitz - chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, Gorochowsky [Shraga Goren], M. Lubarsky[-Bar], and two representatives of the National Headquarters is authorized to determine the allocation of vehicles.

       - Ian [Yannai, head of the Signal Service] reports that we were six months too late to buy the [military] surplus in America. Now purchasing is problematic. They bought: 1) small [radio] sets (MaB) 900 (instead of 600), and also spare parts and diagnostic equipment. 2) 100 (instead of 300) ScR (we have 200 of this type in the country). 3) 300 - mobile sets. Will only arrive in two weeks because they were brought outside of America (with spare parts). 4) 150 - ScR-610 - with a frequency of 30-40. Will only arrive two weeks from now. 5) 70 - 608-1508, frequencies 20-40. 6) 10 Motorola (?). 7) 12 AM/FRCL large stations in new condition, for inter-city communication, will only arrive two weeks from now because they're on the West Coast. 8) 1,000 telephones. 9) 200 switchboards for 6 and 12 lines. 10) 800 miles of telephone wire. 11) laboratory machines per the list prepared by Ishi [Yishayahu Lavi, later commander of the C4I Corps, who compiled all the above data]. 12) receivers for R. S. [radio sets]. 13) generators.

       - Gershon Zak gave me a plan for the organization of a naval force. [We] need P£ 1,200 to lease the ship from South Africa for six months and P£ 800 for the fuel on the ship (as a deposit). I agreed to this. Solel Boneh also has a ship - the Hannah Senesh.

       - Shkolnik [Eshkol]: Friedman [sp.] (a Polish Jew who lives in Tel Aviv and is currently in Gdynia) claims that he'll be able to buy tubes [rifles] in Poland and to send them along with equipment to be delivered to the country.

       - Yigals [Yigael Yadin and Yigal Allon], Nahum [Sarig], Yitzhak S. [Sadeh], Yisrael [Galili] - regarding the Negev.

       Yigael S. [Sukenik-Yadin]: The Negev needs to be a regionally independent unit: this much everyone acknowledges. There is a problem with the Palmach as a national reserve. The Negev staff needs to be set up as an independent staff - and given all the forces it needs. If the Negev can already be subordinated to the General Staff now - this should be done. Until the brigade in the Negev is 100% independent - the connection with the Palmach staff should not be dissolved.

       Yitzhak [Sadeh]: There's a schema - Hayish, garrison force, and Palmach. There's a place in the Negev for a garrison force. No place for Hayish. The Negev poses a particular problem - in terms of conquest, it is a typical Palmach problem. Strike units are needed. There's no point in having strike battalions in the Negev trained any differently than in the Upper Galilee. And only the Palmach staff knows how to organize strike battalions.

       Yigal P. [Peikowitz-Allon]: He believes that all the brigades [i.e., the corps - Palmach, Hayish, and garrison] require subsidiary staffs. He doesn't think the Negev needs to be a special region, but since this is what was decided, then the two battalions that are in the Negev are only on secondment to the Negev commander. The Palmach staff is overseeing their clothing and training and maintaining administrative contact with them.

       Zvi [Ayalon]: The situation has changed. No longer garrison force, Hayish, and strike battalions - but regional battalions and a strategic reserve. He agrees with Yigael [Yadin].

       Nahum [Sarig]: 2½ months in the Negev. When he arrived there were two companies (400 men) there; now there are 900 men arranged in two battalions. There are fortifications, and every fortification has a garrison force. This garrison force is not sufficiently trained to provide material [personnel] for the units. The Palmach provided commanders for the settlements. Without the Palmach staff they wouldn't have done this. The staff provided commanders, instructors, logistics personnel, squad commanders from reservists [experienced Palmach fighters]. As to the question at hand he does not express an opinion - it is not yet clear to him. But he believes that the conditions in the Negev are harsh, and that it is almost impossible to build there; an exceptional home front is needed. He's afraid of losing the help provided by the Palmach staff. The staff know the people involved and know who's a good commander.

       For the people who are there - their connection with the Palmach staff is important.

       Yigal P. [Allon] adds: The Palmach staff can "cut" commanders [for the Negev] from its own battalion because there's a special relationship. Others won't do this to the same extent.

       Yisrael [Galili]: The Negev will need to be like any brigade region. But right now the Negev is empty and needs to be conquered, and therefore he proposes: a national strike brigade, and its staff will be tasked with establishing ten strike battalions. For the Negev region, a regional staff will be established just like any staff, aside those problems that are unique to the Negev. This staff will be subordinate to the General Staff, with no intermediary. The national brigade of the strike forces [the Palmach] will transfer individuals to the authority of the Negev brigade commander. These battalions will continue to maintain a connection with the General Staff of the strike battalions - with respect to the exchange of units, induction and training of new recruits, training of commanders, and continuing training of commanders.

       I voiced my astonishment regarding those who cannot distinguish between the past - when the various patterns of the "Organization" [the Haganah] were formed - and the war needs of today. The main type of change was that the Palmach was enlisted [i.e., comprised enlisted fighters] and others did not [enlist], and therefore it could train more. Now everyone is enlisted. It's also necessary to clarify whether strike battalions and a strategic reserve force are the same thing. It seems to me that every brigade needs a special strike force. The Negev is a different "region" compared with all the other regions. There's no Jewish settlement there; even the "settlements" are in fact only fortifications, and the people there are a garrison force. And the Negev needs to be conquered - and everyone there will be a soldier. The only question is this: What force is needed for the Negev, what equipment and training - in accordance with the requirements of the Negev (not based on the surplus of the few who are there now). [They've] entwined mysticism with mystification. It is not the Negev that exists for the Palmach staff, but rather the reverse. The force that is pinned down in the Negev will have a staff that is subordinate to the General Staff. If any [battalion] from any other region is sent there - a reserve battalion - it will be "on secondment."

       I asked Yigael S. [Yadin] to draft a written proposal of the conclusions:

       A regional staff will be established in the Negev region following the format of any regional staff, with the addition of requirements unique to this region.

       The Negev staff will be subordinate, like any staff, to the supreme command, [will have command over] all the permanent forces (garrison and Hayish) from the Negev settlements and the battalions sent there.

       Until a new order is given, it will have command over strike battalions seconded from the national strike brigade. The relationship between the strike battalions in the Negev and the strike brigade staff entails only: induction, training, and the continuing training of commanders.

       - In the afternoon a delegation of three from Bet Yosef [a moshav in the Bet She'an Valley] came to see me: two women and a man. They have only 35 settlers, not all of them can guard, there are sick people, 50-year-olds, all take [guard] posts. The Water Institute sits near the Jordan, no fence, no fortifications. They're not holding up. [They're] demanding a reinforcement of at least 40 men (according to the standard - 150). They were promised reinforcement, which wasn't sent. There are ten Hayish - providing security for the roads.

       - Friedland [Uriel Shalon] from Haifa: The "government" composition is making waves in Haifa. There's tension among the General Zionists. There's a problem with the municipal police in Haifa. At the checkpoints they're not allowing Haganah members [who maintain order in the city] to examine [British] army vehicles. If a municipal police is established, it has to include Arabs. [Haifa District Commissioner] Law is in favor of a municipal police. The police is uncertain; the army is opposed because it wants free movement in the city. The regular police includes 500 Arab policemen and only 40 Jews. There's a proposal to form a municipal police based on equality, 300 Jews, 300 Arabs, from the regular police. Who will pay? In Jerusalem the government provides half, and the municipality is supposed to provide half. The "Organization" [Haganah] is demanding this because it will ease the burden of protection for them.

       Haifa's Arabs want peace. The Arab committee [in the city] is composed of farming people. They're proposing peace by May 15 - in the area from Balad al-Sheikh to Zikhron Ya'akov, and onwards. In Friedland's view they really want peace. The "delegation" received the Mufti's consent to this. The "Organization" in Haifa - Commander Jacob Lublini - is not inclined towards peace. Arabs are continuing to leave Haifa. The "hawks" believe that the exodus will increase. But the Jewish community in Haifa is also suffering. The economic situation is not bad. There's no lack of work, but there are problems. A lot of money is being spent on fortifications; they're trying to return [Jews] who fled peripheral neighborhoods.

       Friedland estimates that 15,000 Arabs have left Haifa. The wealthy have gone to Beirut. The village laborers have returned to their villages. The [Arab] neighborhood of Halisa has been emptied out, snipers remain there, and the army is stationed there. So far relations with the authorities have been good. But Law will leave, and will be succeeded by Pollock [District Commissioner for Jerusalem]. Relations with the army are not so good, but not bad. The commander is [General] Stockwell.

       - Yitzhak Sadeh: He's currently working on the plan for an armored battalion for the Negev - 360 men. This requires 24 armored vehicles and another 25 service vehicles. There's a course for 15 armored corps commanders in Sarona [the Kirya, government complex in Tel Aviv]. Sent from different places. All have passed platoon commander rank. Some were in the army. The course lasts 20 days. At the [armored corps] staff - Herman [Felix Beatus] (from Poland), Arkadi [Safrut] (from Russia), served in tank units. [They're] about to form four armored corps battalions (the number [of men] is equivalent to two infantry battalions).

       - A long conversation with Nahum Sarig about the situation in the Negev. The Arabs are afraid of the Jews. The Bedouin are not a fighting force - but rather hunters. In Gaza an Egyptian commander has taken control, and after he failed with local men he brought 40 fighters from Egypt. He has three armored [vehicles] (one is ours). The [Arab] peasants are afraid that Jews will burn their fields. Two prominent sheikhs (of the Tarabin and ''Azazme [tribal groups]) are trying to ensure peace.

       There are eight airfields [landing strips] [in the Negev]: Nir-Am, Be'erot Yitzhak, Nirim, Urim, Tze'elim, Revivim, Nevatim, Bet Eshel, Halutza (Revivim and Be'erot Yitzhak can also accommodate the landing of a large four-engine airplane).

       - Air Service budget for March: P£ 63,305

       Personnel upkeep P£ 2,695 (course for 30 pilots 820, for 30 mechanics 975, 30 [?]900), upkeep of two air squadrons 8,000, purchase of fuel 3,500, containers for fuel 7,200 (how many [?]), preparation of airfields 6,500, apparatus [career] personnel 2,000, procurement 3,010 (clothes P£ 360, spare parts 1,200, radio sets 600, camp tools P£ 850) transport 1,800, workshops for hangars 9,000, residential camp 15,000, deliverymen and miscellaneous 3,000, receipt of goods from abroad 1,600.