Monday, August 2, 1948
[Negev Brigade Commander] Nahum Sarig came. Over the course of ten days [July 9-18] the Egyptians tried to completely cut off the Negev - and didn't succeed (?). From the outset the Egyptians were focused not on the Negev but on the [entire] country, but when they failed - they narrowed their efforts to the Negev. Now they're capturing strongholds "coldly," nullifying the value of conquering Karatiyya. They're surrounding our stronghold in Bir ''Isluj - capturing [holding onto] their own strongholds to ensure their transport. There's a battalion stationed in Beersheva. The people of Beersheva [its Arab residents] are receiving supplies from the Hebron hills and the Egyptians. Egypt has good information [intelligence], good administration, good organization, much equipment, without combat experience. Their defense capability is good. The Egyptians had seized control over the population and are organizing them into garrison forces (with the power of the whip!) to protect the railway, bases. They've organized manpower for work. The harvest and fortification work are being carried out by the local population under Egyptian supervision. After the capture of each stronghold - about 200 to 300 local Arabs show up to dig trenches, install barbed wire fences. Good administration is evident in all of this.
The ammunition is unlimited - by our standards. Every day 2-3 trains arrive - with soldiers and more equipment. There are also ships that dock. Each train is 30 cars long.
The Egyptians are, without a doubt, the most serious force against us. Their strength in the Negev is growing. Their numbers are estimated at 12,000 men who are part of the Egyptian army, aside from conscripted members of the local population.
Our shortcoming - the lack of unified command. Givati is separate, the Negev [Brigade] is separate. The Egyptians are under a unified command. The Egyptian "signal" is good. Ours is terrible. Everything requires a special officer to coordinate the action with Givati. There's no coordination in the [wireless] signal system of Givati and of the Negev.
In the Negev we have 1,700 men, without the settlements (there are 650 soldiers here who are training for the Negev), of these about 600 are fighters (?!).
There's no transport for the Negev. There's a lot of exhaustion and tension in the units and settlements in the Negev. The settlements almost don't function as settlements, there are no people for the harvest. The pipeline hasn't been damaged. The entire pipeline is in our hands, but there's no force to prevent the Egyptians from positioning themselves on the water line.
Rapid reinforcement is needed. Two infantry battalions, a simple battalion [an infantry battalion for field action], and a garrison battalion are needed. There's a shortfall of 700 men, in addition to the 600 who are training. The settlements need a supplement, both for settlement needs and for security. People can be smuggled in [by foot, between the Egyptian positions], but the problem of supplies will worsen.
The war in the Negev didn't come to a stop [when the truce began]. Suspension of action in the north increased the Egyptians' action in the Negev.
Air transport in the Negev immediately after the truce [began] was okay. Now it's only at night because the Egyptians' activity has increased.
The needs: transport, additional force for the settlements, filling the brigade, unified command in the south.
- At the Staff meeting we discussed the subject matter for "X-Day" [the day on which preparations for renewed warfighting are concluded]. Filling 40 battalions, 24 garrison battalions. There won't be any more than the 12 existing brigades, aside from 4,000 reservists. Yigael again presented his plan to coordinate 4 brigades against the Egyptians, 4 in the Galilee - the rest defensive. I proposed a large concentration of force for the south and the Triangle - and "to defend ourselves" in the Galilee. Zvi [Ayalon] favors the concentration of force solely against the Triangle.
[Binyamin] Mintz. In the Committee of Committees [of the State Council] there's a proposal to have the existing Defense Committee and supplement it with Revisionists and ''Aliya Hadasha. Mapai, Mapam, GZ [General Zionists] are in favor of this. Pinkas is opposed because there will be only one Mizrachi [representative] left. There's a question about the committee for the conscript and his family [the Committee for the Soldier] - whether to transfer it to the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Finance. Mintz proposes himself in order to purchase kosher meat in the United States and South Africa. This needs to be clarified with Yosef Avidar.
- A long conversation with Ziama [Aran]. He is pessimistic about the Histadrut and the party. The ministers are not thinking about the public and the members. Everyone is a pope. There's no one in the [Zionist] General Council. Yosef Sprinzak is a disaster, should be removed. Need a coordinating committee of three fresh people whom the public want, a lively General Council - removing the ballast of Zvi Yehuda, Ada [Maimon], Baruch [Eisenstadt-Osnia]. [Need] to produce a daily newspaper. To send 100 young people to the army as squad commander[s]. To establish an active bureau
of 11 men, including 5 from the top tier. Government people should be included in the party. He proposes a gathering [with Aryeh] Bahir, Gershon [Zak], Avraham Aderet, [Yehiel] Duvdevani, Pinhas [Lavon], Bebe [Idelson], Yehudit [Simhoni], Ziama, Elik [Shomroni], Golda [Meir], Moshe [Sharett], [Levi] Shkolnik, Yona Kossoy [Kesse], Nosovitsky [Shraga Netzer], Perski [Shimon Peres], [Haim] Ben-Asher, Elhanan [Yishai] to consult and take action.
- A delegation from the Negev - people from Dorot, Negba [should be: Nir-Am], Ruhama. They weren't able to reveal anything new - because the situation is known. I told them about the likelihoods if the war resumes.
Continued from pages 134-135 [the previous day's diary entry], manpower:
Cannons: 127 o[fficers], 118 s[ergeants], 63 sc [squad commanders], 2266 p[rivates], total 2577 (WC 20) standard?
Engineering: 79 o., 1332 p, total 1411 (34 WC) - standard 2677.
Air Force: 2816 (374 WC).
Navy: 107 o., 18 sc, 1571 p, total 1691 (153 WC).
Total for the corps 313 o., 118 s, 81 sc, 7988 p, total 8500 (581 WC).
Services
MLB: 69 o., 81 s, 85 sc, 1820 p, 2055 total (25 WC).
WC 22 o., 33 s, 18 sc, 458, total 531 (?)
Medical S.: 411 o., 215 s, 132 sc, 1329 p, 2087 total (786 WC)
Companies [?] 22 o., 9 s, 298 p, 329 total (46 WC).
Religious 16 o., 6 s, 29 p[.]
The manpower situation at the end of July (July 29)
In the brigades and battalions and staffs
29,247
(1811 WC)
Standard 36,540
Shortfall 6116
In garrison force
10,881
(499 "
"19,231
8350
Corps
8,939
(664
" 15,000
5838
Services
15,501
(3417
" 18,000
2131
Intake
2,275
(112
Training camps
808
67,651
(6,503 WC)
88,771
19,452
MLB
2,164
48
Wounded casualties 1682, deserters 926, prisoners 77, POWs 788, missing 432, fallen soldiers 2046.
Palmach: Staff 1370 (1094 mobilized[?]?) Yiftah 2143 (541 WC) 1st Battalion 942 (204 WC), 3rd Battalion - 928 (301 WC); Harel 2670 (180 WC), 4th Battalion 590 (46), 5th Battalion - 672 (44), 6th Battalion 680 (75). Negev 1744 (252 WC); 2nd Battalion - 472 (52), 7th Battalion - 383 (81), 8th Battalion - 471 (64), 8th Battalion - 235 (15) - Palmach total 7929 (1087 WC) Golani 2994 (242 WC); staff 93 (22), services 542 (80), 12th Battalion - 593 (21), 13th B. [Battalion] - 595 (37). 14th B. - 650 (56), 15th B - 521 (26). Oded 2129 (174); staff 261 (8), services 275 (106), 11th Battalion - 467 (25), 91st B - 597; 92nd B - 529. Carmeli 2554 (71); staff 57 (15) services 410 (41), 21st B - 522, 22nd B - 642 (1), 23rd Z[B?]. - 476, 24th B - 399 (1). Alexandroni 3331 (125), staff 343 (67), services 143, 32nd B. - 747 (21), 33rd B. - 746 (20), 34th B. - 537 (17), 35th B (ETZEL) 815. Kiriati 2284 (36), staff 69 (17), services 528, 42nd B. - 621 (4)[,] 43rd B. - 562 (8), 44th B. - 504 (7). Givati 3670 (149): staff 205 (24), 51st B. - 816 (38)[,] 52nd B. 637 (18), 53rd B. - 764 (25), 54th B. 543 (33)[,] 55th B. - 705 (11), 7th Brigade - 1612 (4): staff 347 (2), 72nd B - 496, 73rd B. - 308, 79th B. - 562 (2). 8th Brigade - 1042 (1), staff 186[,] 82nd B. 562, 89th B 294 (1) total in brigades 29,247 (1811 WC). Corps - 8939 (664 WC). Artillery 2759 (21), Engineering 1141 (34), AF [Air Force] 2924 (449), Navy 1845 (160) (on bases 1254, on ships 384, coast guard 111, staff 96[)] (In the Air Force: staff 720 (176), bases 692 (199), airfields 1176 (59), squadrons 336 (15)[)].
Garrison force: Oded 414, Golani 1112, Carmeli 2044, Alexandroni 2673, Kiriati 1881, Givati 526, Etsiyyoni 2231, grand total 10881.
Services[:] MLB 2164 (48), WC 608, Medical 2000 (904), Cultural 329 (46), Religious 32 (1), Legal 81 (19), M. TZ. 806 (3), Sarafand [Tzrifin] Camp 181, Tel Litvinsky 222 (3), ''Ein Shemer 213, Discharge Camp 58, POWs 1 - 292, POWs 2 - [blank space]; training base 354-? 421, Intake 1 - 251, Intake 5 - [blank space]; Hemed 287 (71), transport 2197 (72), storage 257; supplies 530 (38), equipment 434 (42), miscellaneous, etc. Total 17,665 (3465 WC).
If [we] deduct WC from the brigades, the Palmach has (7927-1087): 6840 men, 3 full brigades (each brigade 2500).
Golani has (2994-242[)] = 2752 surplus 500; Oded has (2129-174[)] = 1955, shortfall 195 men; Carmeli (2554-71) = 2483, surplus 233, Alexandroni (3331-125) - 3206, surplus 650. Kiriati (2284-36) = 2248 full; Givati (3670-149) - 3521, surplus 1000; 7th Brigade - 1608, shortfall 742; 8th Brigade - 1041, shortfall 1204; the surplus in four brigades (Golani, Carmeli, Alexandroni, and Givati) 2383, arrived in three brigades (Oded, Zayin [7], Het [8]) 2141 - So there are twelve full brigades! Why are [we] 6,116 short of the standard?
According to Yigael, each battalion should have not 750 but 794. 3 battalions - 2,382, for the staff brigade another 450 men, in addition to that another battalion with auxiliary weapons - 300-450 men, an armored company 50 men.